Monday, June 26, 2006

Debt collectors are America's most wanted criminals

A Creditwrench logo


Debt collectors are America's most wanted criminals!

Here is why that is true. Debt collectors violate our counsumer protection laws millions of times daily. They just never stop violating even though they know it is illegal to do so. Those who violate the law are criminals, whether they are ever convicted of their crimes or not.

Tens of hundreds of people including law enforcement agencies must hunt them down daily for a wide variety of reasons. That easily makes debt collectors the most wanted criminals in America today.

In order to help those trying to find debt collectors I have put together a huge data base of America's most wanted criminals.

criminals

Tuesday, August 23, 2005

New Post/Thread Notification: CreditWrench


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the CreditWrench forum of CreditWrench under the title of Experian's hand gets slapped...yet again.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=767

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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Experian's hand gets slapped...yet again....


Experian Agrees to Pay $950,000 in FTC Settlement Over Credit Reports

August 17, 2005
Consumerinfo.com, Inc., doing business as Experian Consumer Direct, has
settled Federal Trade Commission charges that it deceptively marketed "free credit
reports" by not adequately disclosing that consumers automatically would be
signed up for a credit report monitoring service and charged $79.95 if they
didn't cancel within 30 days, in violation of federal law. The settlement requires
Consumerinfo to pay redress to deceived consumers, bars deceptive and
misleading claims about "free" offers, requires disclosure of terms and conditions of
any "free" offers, and requires the defendant to give up $950,000 in
ill-gotten gains.

According to the FTC complaint, the defendant drove consumers to their
www.freecreditreport.com and www.consumerinfo.com Web sites with radio, television,
e-mail and Internet ads that promised free credit reports and a bonus – free
trials of a credit-monitoring service. Ads made claims such as:

FREE! FREE! FREE! Get Your FREE Credit Report Online in Seconds!!!!
Click here to get a FREE copy of your online Credit Report Instantly!
And that's not all. . . along with your INSTANT credit report, we'll give you
30 FREE days of the Credit Check Monitoring Service at no obligation.

Consumers were required to provide detailed personal information and a valid credit card account number to get their credit report. They were assured that, "Your card will not be charged during the free trial period. However, valid credit card information is required to establish your account."

According to the FTC's complaint, Consumerinfo's advertising and Web sites failed to explain adequately that after the free trial period for the credit monitoring service expired, consumers automatically would be charged a $79.95 annual membership, unless they notified the defendant within 30 days to cancel the service. Consumerinfo billed the credit cards that it had told consumers were "required only to establish your account," and, in some cases, automatically renewed memberships by re-billing consumers without notice. The FTC charged
that the defendant's failure to adequately disclose the automatic billing and to get consumers' consent to bill their accounts violated federal law.

The complaint also alleges that Consumerinfo misled consumers about their association with the annual free credit report program for which U.S. consumers are eligible by federal law. A federal law enacted in December 2003, gives consumers the right to get one free credit report every 12 months from each of the three national consumer reporting companies. This program began in western states on December 1, 2004, and will cover all U.S. consumers by September 1, 2005. Consumers can get their free reports by phone, mail, or at one authorized Web site, www.annualcreditreport.com. The FTC complaint alleges that onsumerinfo deceptively advertised and promoted its "free reports" at its "freecreditreport.com" Web site, without disclosing that it was not associated with the official annual free credit report program.

"Consumers paid the price for ordering free credit reports from
freecreditreport.com," said Lydia Parnes, Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. "It's unfair and deceptive to promise consumers something for free and then trick them into paying for products they didn't want in the first place."

"Consumers also need to be alert about impostor sites – sites that misspell annualcreditreport.com or use sound alike names, but don’t link to the authorized site. We are sending letters to operators of more than 130 impostor sites to inform them that we know they are out there and that attempts to mislead consumers are illegal," she said.

The settlement is designed to assure that the defendant's negative-option or "free" offers do not contain misrepresentations, and that they disclose all terms and conditions of the offers. The settlement establishes specific disclosure requirements in promotions for the defendant's "free credit report" offer.
Among other things, the defendant must clearly tell consumers that they will be charged unless they cancel within the trial period, and that the offer is not related to the free credit report program mandated by Congress.

The settlement requires redress for consumers who enrolled in Consumerinfo's credit monitoring program between 2000 and 2003, canceled the monitoring service and received a partial refund or filed a complaint about the charges for the service. Consumers who qualify for a refund should receive a notice from Consumerinfo by email or first class mail within the next few months. The FTC staff has released answers to frequently asked questions available at
www.ftc.gov/freereports to help Consumerinfo customers determine if they’re eligible for a refund. It also has established an information hotline for consumers to call for information on refunds. The phone number is (202) 326-3457.

In addition to the redress program, the settlement requires the defendant to pay $950,000 in ill-gotten gains to the Commission. The money may be used to provide consumer education.

The settlement also contains record-keeping and bookkeeping provisions to allow the FTC to monitor compliance with the order.

The FTC has published two consumer brochures: "Want a Free Annual Credit Report? The Only Official Website is annualcreditreport.com" warns consumers about imposter sites; "Your Access to Free Credit Reports," educates consumers about their right to a free copy of their credit reports, and discusses other consumer rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the FACT Act. Both publications are available in English and Spanish at www.ftc.gov/freereports.
The Commission vote to authorize staff to file the complaint and stipulated final order was 3-0-1, with Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras recused. They were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, in Santa Ana.

The complaint named Consumerinfo.com., Inc., doing business as Experian Consumer Direct, Qspace, Inc., and Iplace Inc. Consumerinfo.com is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Experian North America, which is also the parent company of Experian Information Services, one of the three national credit reporting companies.

This case was brought with the invaluable assistance of the office of
California Attorney General, Bill Lockyer. The agency also wishes to acknowledge the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which filed a complaint about Consumerinfo.com with the Commission, and the World Privacy Forum for reports it submitted to the agency on imposter sites.

NOTE: A stipulated final judgment and order is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by the defendant of a law violation. Stipulated final judgments have the force of law when signed by the judge. Copies of the complaint and consent agreement are available from the FTC’s Web site at http://www.ftc.gov and also from the FTC’s Consumer Response Center, Room 130, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580. The FTC works for the consumer to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices in the marketplace and to provide information to help consumers spot,
stop, and avoid them. To file a complaint in English or Spanish (bilingual counselors are available to take complaints), or to get free information on any of 150 consumer topics, call toll-free, 1-877-FTC-HELP (1-877-382-4357), or use the complaint form at http://www.ftc.gov. The FTC enters Internet, telemarketing, identity theft, and other fraud-related complaints into Consumer Sentinel, a
secure, online database available to hundreds of civil and criminal law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and abroad.

Source: FTC Press Release
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New Post/Thread Notification: CHIT CHAT


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the CHIT CHAT forum of CreditWrench under the title of Something you didn't know or think about..

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=769

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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Wiretap the Internet? Not So Fast, Say Some (http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1124269510528)
The National Law Journal

The federal courts may soon face the first round in a battle over the Justice Department's demand that federal wiretapping requirements be extended to Internet services. The Center for Democracy & Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and others are weighing whether to challenge an FCC requirement that VoIP services accommodate the taps in their designs and applications. Critics say the FCC decision is based on a flawed interpretation of a 1994 law.

That means that services such as Skype, Vonage and others have no technology in place to allow your calls on those services to be wiretapped. Safe communication with no possibility of government snoops being able to listen in on your every word.

And you can use voip in exactly the same way you do your local connection. Let's say you install Voip and disconnect your regular telephone service. You call up your fried acroxx town and tell him that you have a new phone number and it is xxx-xxxx so he dials the VOIP number just like he would any other number.

He never knows that it is a voip munber. The telephone solicitors can't get the number either. Google searches don't reveal your voip number either.

And you get all the bells and whistles the telephone company always charges big bucks for free. All the regular telephones and accessories work with voip the same way they did with the old services.

Sans government snoops.
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Winning against NAF and Arbitation


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Seems that we are winning against NAF now on a fairly regular basis.

A phone call from a lady whom I shall call Katt seems to indicate that such may actually be the case. She was absolutely screaming her happiness over the fact that she had received a letter from NAF staying her arbitration case.

Katt is probably about the 4th or 5th such call I've received from students over the last couple of weeks and all saying pretty much the same. A few more and we might be able to claim that we have now found the key to winning against NAF and arbitration.

We have one student who is going into a court ordered mediation in a couple of days and of course we don't want to go for that either so I've told him what to say to get it back into regular court.

Court ordered mediation is a far different animal than is NAF and the like but that don't mean that the defendant has any greater chance there than they do before NAF.
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New Post/Thread Notification: Arbitration Forum

IC 34-57-2
Chapter 2. Arbitration: Uniform Arbitration Act

IC 34-57-2-1
Written agreement to arbitrate; enforceability; exemptions from chapter
Sec. 1. (a) A written agreement to submit to arbitration is valid, and enforceable, an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid and enforceable, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. If the parties to such an agreement stipulate in writing, the agreement may be enforced by designated third persons, who shall in such instances have the same rights as a party under this chapter. This chapter also applies to arbitration agreement between employers and employees or between their respective representatives (unless otherwise provided in the agreement).
(b) This chapter specifically exempts from its coverage all consumer leases, sales, and loan contracts, as these terms are defined in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (IC 24-4.5).
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-2
Commencement of arbitration; procedure; tolling statute of limitations
Sec. 2. Arbitration shall be initiated by a written notice by either party, mailed by registered or certified mail, or delivered to the other party, briefly stating a claim, the grounds for the claim and the amount or amounts. Issues shall be joined by written notice of admissions or denials and any counterclaims or set-offs so mailed or delivered. The statutes of limitations ceases to run from the time of any notice of claim or counterclaim.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-3
Order to commence arbitration; stay of arbitration proceedings; procedure
Sec. 3. (a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 1 of this chapter, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration. Ten (10) days notice in writing of the hearing of such application shall be served personally upon the party in default. If the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue raised without further pleading and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party; otherwise, the application shall be denied.
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. Ten (10) days notice in writing of the hearing of the application shall be served personally upon the party in default. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith

summarily determined without further pleadings and the stay ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
(c) If an issue referable to arbitration under the alleged agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear applications under subsection (a), the application shall be made in that action or proceeding. Otherwise and subject to section 17 of this chapter, the application may be made in any court with jurisdiction.
(d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application for an order for arbitration has been made under this section (or IC 34-4-2-3 before its repeal), or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect to the issue only. When the application is made in such an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration must include such a stay.
(e) An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown.
(f) If the court determines that there are other issues between the parties that are not subject to arbitration and that are the subject of a pending action or special proceeding between the parties and that a determination of such issues is likely to make the arbitration unnecessary, the court may delay its order to arbitrate until the determination of such other issues or until such earlier time as the court specifies.
(g) On application the court may stay an arbitration proceeding on a showing that the method of appointment of arbitrators is likely to or has resulted in the appointment of a majority of arbitrators who are partial or biased in some relevant respect. The court shall then appoint one (1) or more arbitrators as provided in section 4 of this chapter.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-4
Appointment of arbitrators by agreement or by court
Sec. 4. If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method shall be followed. In the absence of such an agreement, any method of appointment of arbitrators agreed upon by the parties to the contract shall be followed. When an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act, a successor shall be appointed in the same manner as the original appointment. If the method of appointment of arbitrators is not specified in the agreement and can not be agreed upon by the parties, or if agreed method fails or for any reason can not be followed, or if an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and a successor has not been appointed within a reasonable time, the court on application of a party shall appoint one (1) or more arbitrators, who have all the powers of an arbitrator appointed according to the agreement.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.



IC 34-57-2-5
Powers of arbitrators exercised by majority
Sec. 5. The powers of the arbitrators may be exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the agreement or by this chapter.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-6
Hearings; time and place; notice; procedure
Sec. 6. Unless otherwise provided by the agreement:
(a) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and cause notification to the parties to be served personally or by registered mail not less than thirty (30) days before the hearing. Appearance at the hearing waives such notice. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary and, on request of a party and for good cause, or upon their own motion may postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by the agreement for making the award unless the parties consent to a later date. The arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly notified to appear. The court on application may direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy. Any party may require that the hearing be recorded in a manner sufficient for appeal.
(b) The parties are entitled to be heard and to present any and all evidence material to the controversy regardless of its admissibility under judicial rules of evidence.
(c) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators but a majority may determine any question and render a final award. If, during the course of the hearing, an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remaining neutral arbitrator or neutral arbitrators may continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-7
Right to representation by attorney
Sec. 7. A party is entitled to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing under this chapter. A waiver of the right to representation before the proceeding or hearing is ineffective.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.
<> IC 34-57-2-8
Subpoenas for witnesses or documents; depositions; witness fees
Sec. 8. (a) The arbitrators may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of books, records, documents and other evidence, and have authority to administer oaths. In matters subject to arbitration between labor and management, neither party may subpoena or obtain an order for the production of the financial books, financial records, or documents pertaining to the income or financial condition of the other party. Subpoenas so issued shall be served, and upon application to the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced, in manner provided by law for the service and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.
(b) On application of a party, the arbitrators may order the deposition of a witness to be taken for use as evidence, and not for discovery, if the witness can not be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing. The deposition shall be taken in the manner prescribed by law for the taking of depositions in civil actions.
(c) All provisions of law compelling a person under subpoena to testify are applicable and enforceable upon application to the court.
(d) Fees for attendance as a witness are the same as for a witness in the superior court.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-9
Award; form and copies
Sec. 9. (a) The award must be in writing and signed by the arbitrators concurring therein. It must include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators, the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy. The arbitrators shall deliver a copy to each party personally or by registered mail, or as provided in the agreement.
(b) An award shall be made within the time fixed by the agreement or, if not fixed, or, if not agreed upon, within a reasonable time. The parties may extend the time in writing either before or after the expiration of the time. A party waives the objection that an award was not made within the time required unless the party notifies the arbitrators of his objection before service of a signed copy of the award on the party.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-10
Modification or correction of award; procedure
Sec. 10. On written application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending under section 12, 13, or 14 of this chapter (or IC 34-4-2-12, IC 34-4-2-13, or IC 34-4-2-14 before their repeal), on submission to the arbitrators by the court under such conditions as the court may order, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award upon the grounds stated in section 14(a)(1) and 14(a)(3) of this chapter, or for the purpose of clarifying the award. The application shall be made within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to the applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith to the opposing party, stating that the opposing party must serve his objections thereto, if any, within ten (10) days from the notice. The award so modified or corrected is subject to sections 12, 13, and 14 of this chapter.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-11
Fees and expenses of arbitration


Sec. 11. The arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-12
Confirmation of award by court
Sec. 12. Upon application of a party, but not before ninety (90) days after the mailing of a copy of the award to the parties, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in sections 13 and 14 of this chapter. Upon confirmation, the court shall enter a judgment consistent with the award and cause such entry to be docketed as if rendered in an action in the court.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.
IC 34-57-2-13
Vacation of award by court; procedure
Sec. 13. (a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) the award was procured by corruption or fraud;
(2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award can not be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted;
(4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 6 of this chapter, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) there was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 3 of this chapter (or IC 34-4-2-3 before its repeal), and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;
but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this section shall be made within ninety (90) days after the mailing of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption or fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety (90) days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in subsection (a)(5), the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with section 4 of this chapter, or,

if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in subsection (a)(3) or (a)(4), the court may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in accordance with section 4 of this chapter. The time within which the agreement requires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-14
Modification or correction of award by court; procedure
Sec. 14. (a) Upon application made within ninety (90) days after mailing of a copy of the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where:
(1) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;
(2) the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or
(3) the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award so as to effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected. Otherwise, the court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with an application to vacate the award.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.
IC 34-57-2-15
Entry of judgment or decree confirming, modifying, or correcting award; costs
Sec. 15. Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, judgment, or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree. Costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent thereto, and disbursements may be awarded by the court.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-16
Applications to court
Sec. 16. Except as otherwise provided, an application to the court under this chapter shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of court for the making and hearing of motions. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, notice of an initial application for an order shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in civil cases.

<hr align="left" size="2" width="100%">
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.
IC 34-57-2-17
"Court" defined; jurisdiction
Sec. 17. The term "court" means any circuit or superior court. The making of an agreement described in section 1 of this chapter providing for arbitration in <st1:State><st1:place>Indiana</st1:place></st1:State> confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under and to enter judgment on an award thereunder.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-18
Application; proper court
Sec. 18. An application, as provided for in section 3(a) of this chapter, shall be made to the court in the county where the adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if the adverse party has no residence or place of business in this state, to the court of any county. All subsequent applications shall be made to the court hearing the initial application unless the court otherwise directs.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.
IC 34-57-2-19
Appeals authorized; procedure
Sec. 19. (a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) an order denying an application to compel arbitration made under section 3 of this chapter (or IC 34-4-2-3 before its repeal);
(2) an order granting an application to stay arbitration made under section 3(b) of this chapter (or IC 34-4-2-3(b) before its repeal);
(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) a judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this chapter (or IC 34-4-2 before its repeal).
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-20
Applicability of chapter
Sec. 20. This chapter applies only to agreements made after <st1:date month="8" day="18" year="1969">August 18, 1969</st1:date>.
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.53.

IC 34-57-2-21
Construction of chapter
Sec. 21. This chapter shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact similar arbitration statutes.
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Monday, August 15, 2005

New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the Credit repair discussions forum of CreditWrench under the title of Foreclosed & Lates.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=761

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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What should I do about an account that is listed on my report as Foreclosed/120days past due? Do I have any leverage with that for a delete? What you probably need to be more worried about it the probability that they will sue you. The credit repair end of it isn't what's important. That can be taken care of more or less automatically. But if you aren't well prepared for the upcoming lawsuit then when it hits you will have some really bad problems and no realistic way to fight them off. You will then have to learn an awful lot in a very, very short period of time.
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A Creditwrench logo

OK, Dr. Weatherly.
Having been a choirpractor for 33 years most assuredly does give you the right to use the title of "Dr." whereever you go. So does having a doctorate in any subject of study.

And so now I'll add just a bit to that education because it is not only you but lots more folks who don't know what a blog is.

Blogs have been around since about 1998 or so. The first of them was one known as blogger as it still is today altough it was bought out by Google about a year ago. That made blogs an instant hit with everybody. At first blogging was tremendously difficult since the coding was not at all standard and still isn't today. Then they added what is known as a wysiwyg editor. Wysiwyg simply translates into "What You See Is What You Get" meaning that as you type it is automatically converted into code just like it is here. Some such editors are extremely versitile and others are almost brain dead and have very limited capability.

Blogs are often described as being personal diaries because anyone can write about anything they want. There are untold millions of blogs on the internet today and while the majority of them are written by kids talking about school work or dating or parties they went too and just plain people in different lands talking about friends or family or life in their country or whatever. But since Google bought out Blogger
the major corporations are now getting into blogging big time. The first real use of Blogging by major corporations was probably the media during the recent invasion of Iraq.

If you followed the news back then as most of us did you were probably pretty quick to pick up on the fact that the coverage was done by what was called "embedded reporters" who were right there with the troops on the front lines. They had laptops and were connected to their newsrooms by satellite and we got to see what war was like first hand. It was almost as if we were there in person. Photos were done with digital cameras and so could be uploaded almost instantly.

Then big business began to get into the act and now all of the big players are into blogging one way or another. Sometimes it's done by some big executive and sometimes by some company employee. GM, Ford and most of the auto makers are into to it and that isn't even the tip of the iceberg. I started my blog several years ago but the coding was so hard to do that I didn't do any actual blogging until they came out with their new editor. That wss in the early part of 3003 if I remember right and I started doing something with mine in May of that year. Now I've got over 50 Blogs scattered all over the internet. They cover a wide range of topics. Just after blogger got easy to work with they also implemented what is known as RSS or Really Simple Syndication which is a language all of it's own. Then Google came out with what is known as API keys and together they actually feed the blog to the search engines and are used in what is known as aggregators. Now RSS is also being used in what is known as PODCASTING and VLOGS. Podcasting is audio broadcasting and VLOGS are blogs which have a lot of video on them.
Then they came along with the MP3 players such as the IPAQ by Apple and many more.

People are buying them by the millions because they can download music into their IPAQ and listen to music on the go. They can also plug them into their car stereos and listen to the music on their stereos. Now we have regular podcasting stations just like radio stations. Advertisers are picking up on that and they are putting out the music, commentaries and what have you interspersed with advertising just like you hear on regular AM or FM radio.

Blogs that deal with interesting subjects, have lots of fresh new content every day and lots of links are what the search engines are looking for and if your blog has good content and lots of links both coming and going then the search engine "spiders" will come crawling very frequently. If your blog talks about your high school football team or your latest drinking party or your latest and greatest date it will never make the search engines. Most of mine have lots of traffic and lots of content because I am always posting new articles and have lots of links.

Of course, most of those here probably have visited the j-accuse blog and some have visited my Creditwrench Blog but I also have one which deals with news coming out of the Oklahoma State Legislature. The media relations departments of the Oklahoma State House of Representatives and the Oklahoma State Senate constantly send me all their press releases and I post most of them to the blog at http://magnacartanews.blogspot.com so that gets a lot of activity.

I also have one at and the debt collectors really hate that one What I have to say about them on that blog isn't real complimentary to say the least. Probably about the most complimentary thing I have to say about debt collectors is that if they had a brain they might be a bit dangerous.

So go check out the blogs and see what they are all about. Then you may see why they are so important. What it might take a long time to figure out on your own is that in today's business world you must have a web site and you must hae a blog that talks about your business or you just might not be in business for all that much longer. It is just that simple and those business people who don't realize that are going to have an increasingly tough time staying in business as all their competition jump onto the bandwagon.

Sunday, August 14, 2005

New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the Credit repair discussions forum of CreditWrench under the title of 3 old late CC payments killing me. Help!.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=757

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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Me, angry?! nah, you all are doing us schmucks a great service. My wife is the one who made the late payment when she was not well, not me, but I am stuck with it..... I would not be the least bit surprised to learn that your wife probably could name one or more ways in which she is stuck with things you did or didn't do as well. Nothing new there.
Life's like that. (LOL)

Well, it dropped my credit score by 27 points, so since I need to refi now as my adjustable rate mortgage just went from 5.9 to 9%...major ouch..... Seems like a major out but there is a way to reduce that bite and that is to look at your score a year or two down the road and as soon as it increases refinance the house.

If you have not signed the mortgage yet then now is the time to look into the mortgage and be sure you don't get stuck with a non-judicial foreclosure type of mortgage, additional fees if you do refinance, pay off early and ect. Make sure you get disability insurance that will pay off the mortgage in the event you bounce off a speeding freight train, stub your toe while leaping tall buildings and end up splattered all over the pavement or some other mishap occurs so that you are disabled or meet an early and untimely demise.

See whether there are arbitration clauses in the contract or not. Make sure you understand the terms of the contract and if you can't understand the legalese in the contract then pay an attorney to check those things out for you.

Prepare yourself now for possible failure later on. You will be very glad that you did. Then when your score improves in a year or two you can refinance. at a much better rate.

If that one late charge is the only negative you have on your score then you might think about using the 3 bank trick to improve your score.
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New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions


Hello,

DaveBis has just posted in the Credit repair discussions forum of CreditWrench under the title of 3 old late CC payments killing me. Help!.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=757

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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One one particular credit card I had 3.5 late payments consecutively about 3 year ago. Those REALLY killed my fico score.

I was having the Mrs do the bookkeeping, and she was not well and overmedicated...and she justt lost track....

The minimal payments were only around $75 per month, so it is not like I didn't have the $....

Right now my middle score is 589....CreditInform tells me that two credit cards which have average balances on them of 6K, both near the limit are hurting me...they say if I reduce them just below 50% of maximum balance, that it will raise my score around 20-30 points....but...I would love to get it just above 670, the better rate threshold for a home refinance.

At 589 FICO on a stated income no points loan, these people want 8.2% interest rates! They're insane!

The credit cards with the 3 late consecutive payments is Chase Manhattan....

I need some advice on how I can tackle that with form letters, plots and strategies.....wish I could just hire someone to deal with all this...but, here I am......

Thanks folks!
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New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions

http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=757
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At the risk of greatly angering you, yes, I do have a generic letter that should be used in all cases.

The letter should be the copy of the payment slip they sent you well in advance of the payment due date accompanied by a check of at least twice the amount of the minimum payment and should be religiously repeated every month. But then you already knew that, didn't you? (LOL)

The next best generic letter after the damage has already been done is to simply dispute the debt with the credit bureau claiming "never late" and hope that the credit card company will get tired of answering the same demand for verification and just ignore it and it will fall off.

Or the CRA will get tired of the same old demand for verification and refuse to let you keep on filing that complaint.

Truth is that you were late and the report is accurate, true and correct.
It won't mean much in a year or two so you may just have to wait until it quits getting reported.
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Credit repair discussions

http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=754
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The law is very clear on this matter. If they deleated it once and you have proof of that. They must send you a notice within five days if they re-inserted if not they are in violation of FCRA.. If they have done this several time each time is a seperate violation Answer: talk to them on that basis one time ask them where the notice is they are suppose to send when they re-insert within 5 days. If they do not cooperate Take'm to FED court and I assure you it will come off your report pretty damn quick.. Of course you have to know how to proceed and that is what Creditwrench teaches you!! Here's the law section of FCRA that applies: In green
§ 611. Procedure in case of disputed accuracy [15 U.S.C. § 1681i]

(a) Reinvestigations of disputed information.

(1) Reinvestigation required.
(A) In general. If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer's file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly of such dispute, the agency shall reinvestigate free of charge and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file in accordance with paragraph (5), before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer.
(B) Extension of period to reinvestigate. Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the 30-day period described in subparagraph (A) may be extended for not more than 15 additional days if the consumer reporting agency receives information from the consumer during that 30-day period that is relevant to the reinvestigation.
(C) Limitations on extension of period to reinvestigate. Subparagraph (B) shall not apply to any reinvestigation in which, during the 30-day period described in subparagraph (A), the information that is the subject of the reinvestigation is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or the consumer reporting agency determines that the information cannot be verified.
(2) Prompt notice of dispute to furnisher of information.
(A) In general. Before the expiration of the 5-business-day period beginning on the date on which a consumer reporting agency receives notice of a dispute from any consumer in accordance with paragraph (1), the agency shall provide notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of information in dispute, at the address and in the manner established with the person. The notice shall include all relevant information regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the consumer. </DD><DD>(B) Provision of other information from consumer. The consumer reporting agency shall promptly provide to the person who provided the information in dispute all relevant information regarding the dispute that is received by the agency from the consumer after the period referred to in subparagraph (A) and before the end of the period referred to in paragraph (1)(A). </DD><DD>(3) Determination that dispute is frivolous or irrelevant. </DD></DL><DIR>(A) In general. Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a consumer reporting agency may terminate a reinvestigation of information disputed by a consumer under that paragraph if the agency reasonably determines that the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant, including by reason of a failure by a consumer to provide sufficient information to investigate the disputed information.(B) Notice of determination. Upon making any determination in accordance with subparagraph (A) that a dispute is frivolous or irrelevant, a consumer reporting agency shall notify the consumer of such determination not later than 5 business days after making such determination, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by any other means available to the agency.(C) Contents of notice. A notice under subparagraph (B) shall include (i) the reasons for the determination under subparagraph (A); and(ii) identification of any information required to investigate the disputed information, which may consist of a standardized form describing the general nature of such information. <DL><DD>(4) Consideration of consumer information. In conducting any reinvestigation under paragraph (1) with respect to disputed information in the file of any consumer, the consumer reporting agency shall review and consider all relevant information submitted by the consumer in the period described in paragraph (1)(A) with respect to such disputed information. </DD><DD>(5) Treatment of inaccurate or unverifiable information. </DD></DL>(A) In general. If, after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1) of any information disputed by a consumer, an item of the information is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified, the consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete that item of information from the consumer's file or modify that item of information, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation.(B) Requirements relating to reinsertion of previously deleted material. (i) Certification of accuracy of information. If any information is deleted from a consumer's file pursuant to subparagraph (A), the information may not be reinserted in the file by the consumer reporting agency unless the person who furnishes the information certifies that the information is complete and accurate.(ii) Notice to consumer. If any information that has been deleted from a consumer's file pursuant to subparagraph (A) is reinserted in the file, the consumer reporting agency shall notify the consumer of the reinsertion in writing not later than 5 business days after the reinsertion or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by any other means available to the agency.(iii) Additional information. As part of, or in addition to, the notice under clause (ii), a consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer in writing not later than 5 business days after the date of the reinsertion (I) a statement that the disputed information has been reinserted;(II) the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reasonably available, or of any furnisher of information that contacted the consumer reporting agency, in connection with the reinsertion of such information; and(III) a notice that the consumer has the right to add a statement to the consumer's file disputing the accuracy or completeness of the disputed information.(C) Procedures to prevent reappearance. A consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to prevent the reappearance in a consumer's file, and in consumer reports on the consumer, of information that is deleted pursuant to this paragraph (other than information that is reinserted in accordance with subparagraph (B)(i)).(D) Automated reinvestigation system. Any consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall implement an automated system through which furnishers of information to that consumer reporting agency may report the results of a reinvestigation that finds incomplete or inaccurate information in a consumer's file to other such consumer reporting agencies.</DIR><DL><DD>(6) Notice of results of reinvestigation. </DD></DL>(A) In general. A consumer reporting agency shall provide written notice to a consumer of the results of a reinvestigation under this subsection not later than 5 business days after the completion of the reinvestigation, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by other means available to the agency.(B) Contents. As part of, or in addition to, the notice under subparagraph (A), a consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer in writing before the expiration of the 5-day period referred to in subparagraph (A) (i) a statement that the reinvestigation is completed;(ii) a consumer report that is based upon the consumer's file as that file is revised as a result of the reinvestigation;(iii) a notice that, if requested by the consumer, a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information shall be provided to the consumer by the agency, including the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted in connection with such information and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reasonably available;(iv) a notice that the consumer has the right to add a statement to the consumer's file disputing the accuracy or completeness of the information; and(v) a notice that the consumer has the right to request under subsection (d) that the consumer reporting agency furnish notifications under that subsection.

I have been in an argument with Trans Union because I disputed a TL and they deleted it. They are the only CRA it was on and they sent me a corrected report when they deleted it. Then I pulled a report from True Credit and MYFICO and it was listed under Trans Union. I called TU and they assured me it was no longer reporting and I called back several times and ended up supposedly speaking with a manager and he told me it was definately not being reported anymore so I told him to send me a copy of my report so I could see for myself and Lo and Behold..... There it is! Got any ideas what I should do?
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Friday, August 12, 2005

Credit repair discussions

This discussion is located here


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Yes, they often do want that information and it does pose some problems.

Here is how I recommend providing them with that info with the least amount of mailing costs and exposure risks involved.

Go to a copy shop and get a clean sheet of paper, maybe even out of the waste basket. Then fold it in half and crease it then fold it in half again. That will effectively divide the sheet into 4 parts without leaving any marks that will show up on the copier.

Next place your driver's license and SS card in the middle of the upper left hand quadrant as measured by the blank sheet you have doubled up. Use that as an actual backing. Since you will be putting the DL and SS card face down on the copier you can move them around a bit after they are under the paper.

Next set the copier for a 200% blowup and the lightest possible contrast.

Then shoot some copies so you have enough for future use too.

You will immediately see that the cards will be centered in the middle of the resultant 81/2 by 11 copies coming out of the machine.

The copies are easy to read and will save a sheet of paper in your mailing envelope.

Also go see your attorney and have him prepare a letter on his stationary stating where you live and how long you have lived there. Have him notarize it and then get some copies of that. Doing that eliminates the need for copies of all your utility bills, credit card statements and what have you that you might otherwise send them. No personal information is revealed using the letter from an attorney method. They want to argue about that let them call up your attorney and argue with him about that.

(LOL)
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New Post/Thread Notification: CreditWrench IRS TAX FORUM


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the CreditWrench IRS TAX FORUM forum of CreditWrench under the title of Subject: Larken Rose Trial - Day 3.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=752

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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Larken Rose Trial

Day 3

Wednesday, August 10, 2005

9:10 AM we started with a nearly full court room, with 38 supporters of Larkin,
9 IRS agents or court clerk and staff and 2 reporters present.

First thing was the testimony of Witness Donald Pearlman the Special Agent of
the IRS who investigated who in the middle (September) of 2000 had Larken's
case, which was previously under civil investigation and then another agent was
looking at it to see if there were any tax violations by Larken.

He [Witness Donald Pearlman] felt that a search warrant was needed due to the
fact that key evidence might be destroyed, if it hadn't already been done, as
items of income and expense and, as a result, two (2) search warrants were
issued, for his home and Dr. Clayton in Texas.

At Larken's place many items were seized, such as: large number of financial
documents, issues related to tax law and documents, e-mails, hard copy
documents, audio and video recordings. The vast majorities of computer
evidence were copied off of his computers, rather than physically taking them
away.

As a result, he contacted a number of banks and that of the payers of income to
Larken, so that they could establish his income, by original documents. He
requested checks and other documents from Chase Bank. One of the checks is an
over $2,300 check issued to the IRS which on the memo says "abolish the IRS."

With the Raid, they found a letter from a U.S. Senator to another individual
that states that the 861 argument is false. Another document was from another
U.S. Senator, to another individual that essentially states that, the 861
argument, is incorrect. Another document was from a U.S. Senator of Larken's,
which has an answer of the Congressional Research Service, which states that
861 of the code does NOT exempt the income of U.S. Citizens.

Another letter is from anther U.S. Senator that stated that the 861 argument is
false. A constituent of Senator Tom Daschle, says the same thing. A letter
from IRS to another individual states the proper application of the 861
document and another example that notice was given to Larken about the error of
his argument.

Another letter was by Congressman Porter Goss [now the head of the CIA, Ed.]
stating that the 861 argument is false. Another one is from Carl Levin of
Michigan to another one, stating the same. Another was from Senator Kate
Hutchinson to Dr. Tom Clayton, stating that Section 61 makes ALL income
taxable.

Another document is a letter from Congressman Jeff Blame of Arizona to anther
individual that contains a brochure called "The Truth About Frivolous Tax
Arguments". This document specifically states that Section 861 of the code is
a "frivolous argument" and is only to make sure that NO one is double taxed in
U.S. and a foreign country.

Now the Government went over the E-mails that they got from his computer:

An E-mail between Dr. Clayton and Larken. Larken in this e-mail states that he
is "obsessed" with the IRS, since they take such a large amount of his taxes
from him. In another e-mail he states that he started his battle after his
living budget became very tight.

In another e-mail of Larken to Dr. Clayton states that for many people it is
hard to believe that their own government has become a bunch of extortionists'
fraud. In another e-mail between these two, Larken states that, "nothing can
give anyone the power to rule me." In some e-mails Larken used profanities to
describe the IRS or Government.

In another e-mail he calls the IRS an extortionist organization and, "the only
check against the IRS is a million people with guns, standing up to the IRS"
next e-mail stated that he will not stop until the IRS is buried in the history
books. In next e-mail Larken says: "It is time for trial by fire" "IRS agents",
"I will use any dirty trick, scheme or lie that I could make up."

At the raid, Larken said many things to him at the time of the raid. Larken
said that he was able to pay off his home mortgage early by "good budgeting and
not getting robbed." To this agent, that meant not paying income taxes.

Larken said that he got letters from the IRS that his 861 argument is wrong and
he did not feel that they are binding. He said that he would not change his
mind if a jury or judge said that he was wrong. The judge did NOT allow the
tape of this agent and Larken to be played to the jury

Cross examination by Larken started at 10:15 AM.

Agent found nothing deceptive by Larken besides NOT reporting his income and
admitted receipt of compensation for services. Larken interfered with the
administration of the tax laws by operating his web sites. Larken called IRS
agent criminals and providing guidance for people to not file income taxes.

Larken had asked his web site followers to ask their Congressmen and Senators
about the 861 issue and to send those responses to him.

At 10:55 AM, we took a break and resumed at 11:12 AM. The IRS seized over
10,000 e-mails on the raid. Agent Pearlman reviewed hundreds of the e-mails.
Various IRS agents for content reviewed over 1,000 of these e-mails.

Larken had Agent Pearlman go over and/or read the other parts of these e-mails,
to put the quotation from these e-mail IN CONTEXT by reading additional parts
of these mails. Of course, Pearlman was evasive in his answers and would not
easily answer the simple "Yes" or "No" answers that Larken asked him.

At 12 noon, Special Agent Pearlman's testimony is over. A former IRS agent told
us Agent Pearlman was ONLY testifying in a way they were trained to do and that
he came across as though he learned his training well. When it was to his
advantage, he expressed himself with good memory and completeness. When it was
to his disadvantage, he would hedge and ask questions and be evasive. It was
annoying to hear his testimony.

At 12:22 PM, the next witness, Maureen MacDormett, who is an IRS Revenue Agent
took the stand. She examined some of the documents that were seized in the
raid of Larken Rose's home. She was a summary witness. A summary Witness's
job is to add up all the evidence that the government has produced (Pay stubs,
1099, checks, bank records, witness testimony) to add it all up and figure out
how much income the person (in this case, Larken) made, in during the years in
question.

It is difficult to listen to this because it is all evidence that Larken has
admitted to and this witness's testimony is so repetitive of admitted evidence
that just drags on and on unnecessarily. An example is asking her for a
definition of the "medical transcription business" when this was done with a
prior witness, Art Thompson. Also asking for the methodology of arriving at the
income was repeated. This tends to make slow go even slower!

At 2:15 PM, we returned from lunch and Judge Baylson gave a discourse to the
jury about the Bell case letting them know this case was NOT directly relevant
to Larken's willfulness to file case.

Larken's defense begins with his standby counsel Larry Becraft, questioning the
first witness, Larken Rose. Starting with general background questions. More
supporters of Larken have come since this morning. The number of his present
supporters is now up to 56 people, with 9 IRS agents present and two reporters.
The courtroom is almost full now.

Why did he not file? He had never seen the law before. Starting sometime in
1997 he began looking at and researching the law and became convinced it was a
mistake and would be wrong to sign and file a return.

During the years through 1996 they filed and paid income taxes.

In 1997 he first began hearing different views about the income tax. He looked
into many and found out they were NOT valid. How did he look into them? On
the internet he was able to look up the law and found the flaws in them. In
1997 they were both working long hours and made about $40,000 and taking
$10,000 of that for taxes. This motivated him to look into this.

In middle of 1997 he looked at the IRS Code and regulations and the 861 issue on
Federal Government's web site, after he read an article by Thurston Bell. After
reading the current IRS codes and regulations, eventually he got interested in
the roots of the law and its history. Larken felt that by understanding the
seed, hopefully he would better understand the tree.

Then he went to the actual law libraries (not online) so that he could find the
old tax laws. He wanted to confirm or refute the accuracy of Thurston Bell's
Article. The indexes of the Code lead him to Section 861 about the sources of
income.

#1: The first regulations he read was that of 1939 about the "Meaning of
Income."

#2: Then he looked at the regulation on "exclusions to income." These two (2)
regulations helped him develop the belief that there IS income that is excluded
because of the Constitutional limitations on government power.

Exhibit #3: Next he read the 1924 Income Tax Regulation (Article 71) which also
stated that there is "some income" that is excluded from taxation due to the
fundamental law. Then he looked at the Black's law dictionary for a term that
says:

". . .when law apply to a specific issue, it necessarily excludes others not
mentioned."

Then in the 1917 Gould decision, he understood that government can NOT tax you
beyond what the law allows and if there is any doubt, it MUST be ruled in favor
of the citizen.

#7: Exhibit says that "not only Congress has the power to tax, but the power to
regulate commerce," which means Congress can tax foreign commerce.

#11: An IRS regulation came across it in Bell's article in 1997.

#12 ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
??? ??? ???

Section 1 and 61 regulations and index tell you to go to Section 861 for a
determination of what is taxable or not.

#17: 1040 Income Tax Form says that we must report our foreign source income,
but does NOT mention domestic source income.

The first report on his research, written in 1998, was only twelve (12) pages
long and by 2000 had grown to sixty (60) pages. He met Dr. Thomas Calyton in
2000 and Thomas Clayton told him that they should have their own web site
www.taxableincome.net (http://www.taxableincome.net/) .

Judge ruled that tomorrow Larken can show at least five (5) minutes of his
video, WITHOUT sound, but not at the same moment that he is talking about it.
We finished today at 4:30 PM.

Yours in truth, freedom and justice,

Peymon, Ross, Harry and Ken</pre>
***************

Thursday, August 11, 2005

New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the Credit repair discussions forum of CreditWrench under the title of Validation of Debt.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=750

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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Is there a special (or good) way to word the letter to the debtor (or does one send it to the Credit Bureau) when one is attempting to validate a debt ?
You seem to be really confused on stuff. First of all the debtor does not normally send a letter to the debtor. You are the debtor. There are very rare instances when you might want to do that.

Credit Bureaus do not ever validate the debt. They only verify the listing they have and that is a much lower standard than is validation.
***************

New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the Credit repair discussions forum of CreditWrench under the title of Validation of Debt.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=750

Here is the message that has just been posted:
***************
When one asks for validation of debt what you are saying is "Hey, wait a minute, I'm not sure this debt is mine and I want you to prove it." Pitfalls? Personally I can't think of any. Maybe the Wrench will know of some.
Well, I think I have to disagree with you just a wee bit on that statement.
You are not wrong in what you said but I think it goes a whole lot furthr than that.

Not only are you saying that you want them to prove it is your debt but also to provide all the informaton that you will need to avail yourself of your right to dispute the debt or any portion thereof.

Anything less than that would obviously be a denial of your right to dipute the debt or any portion thereof.

That's the way I see it.
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New Post/Thread Notification: Credit repair discussions

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That is an excellent question. Your formal education in understanding just what that means should begin here: http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/fdcpact.htm You can scroll down to section 809, but you really should familiarize yourself with the entire Act.

When one asks for validation of debt what you are saying is "Hey, wait a minute, I'm not sure this debt is mine and I want you to prove it." Pitfalls? Personally I can't think of any. Maybe the Wrench will know of some.
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Wednesday, August 10, 2005

New Post/Thread Notification: CreditWrench


Hello,

Creditwrench has just posted in the CreditWrench forum of CreditWrench under the title of A case against Capitol One.

This thread is located at http://www.creditwrench.com/consumers/showthread.php?threadid=749

Here is the message that has just been posted:
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<hr noshade="noshade"> <center>California Anti-SLAPP Project

</center> <hr noshade="noshade"> <center>Yu et al. v. Signet Bank/Virginia et al.

Cite as: 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 516

WILLIAM YU et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents
v.
SIGNET BANK/VIRGINIA et al., Defendants and Appellants

WILLIAM YU et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants
v.
SIGNET BANK/VIRGINIA et al., Defendants and Respondents

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4

A094519, A095102

Filed October 30, 2002

(Appeal from Alameda County Superior Court, H-184674-8, Honorable Barbara J. Miller, J.)

</center>
COUNSEL:

For Defendants/Appellants (A094519): Morrison & Foerster, James F. McCabe, Gregory P. Dresser, James R. McGuire.

For Plaintiffs/Respondents: The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant, Mark T. Johnson, Law Office of William E. Kennedy, William E. Kennedy.

For Plaintiffs/Appellants (A095102): The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant, Law Office of William E. Kennedy, William E. Kennedy.

For Defendants/Respondents: Morrison & Foerster, James F. McCabe, Gregory P. Dresser, James R. McGuire.

OPINION:

In Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1377 (Yu I), we reversed a summary judgment entered for defendants Signet Bank/Virginia and Capital One Bank (collectively Banks) on causes of action in the second amended complaint of plaintiffs William and Darlene Yu for abuse of process, and unlawful and unfair business practice (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). In the present appeal by the Yus (A095102), we reverse the judgment entered for Banks on these causes of action after their demurrer to the third amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. In Banks' appeal (A094519), we affirm the order denying their motion to strike the action under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; hereafter § 425.16).


<center>I. BACKGROUND</center> A. Our Prior Decision

As described in Yu I, this lawsuit seeks to redress an improper debt collection practice of Virginia banks against California residents. The Yus accepted a credit card from Signet in 1989, used it to make purchases, and defaulted on repayments. Signet sued them on the debt in Virginia in 1994, obtained a default judgment, and served a "garnishment summons" on a Virginia office of William Yu's employer, with directions that it be forwarded to his place of employment in California. Mr. Yu's wages were garnished from November 1994 to May 1995 to satisfy the judgment. The Yus had no contact with Virginia other than their credit card with Signet.

The Yus filed this class action suit against Signet and its successor, Capital One, alleging that Banks' "long-arm program" of pursuing collection actions in Virginia against California credit card holders constituted "distant forum abuse," the practice of collecting consumer obligations by suing debtors in distant locations to deprive them of the opportunity to defend themselves. (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1389, citing Chen, Due Process as Consumer Protection: State Remedies for Distant Forum Abuse (1986) 20 Akron L.Rev. 9, 10-13.) Distant forum abuse is "unconscionable" (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 107, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817) and "insidious" (Chen, supra, 20 Akron L. Rev. at p. 15) conduct employing "an ostensibly legitimate legal process to deprive consumers of basic opportunities which should be afforded all litigants" (ibid). "Misuse of the courts in this manner contributes to an undermining of confidence in the judiciary by reinforcing the unfortunate image of courts as 'distant' entities, available only to wealthy or large interests," and leads consumers "to conclude that the legal system is merely a 'rubber stamp' for the improper practices utilized by predatory agencies." (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., supra, at p. 108.) Thus, "courts have a strong interest in ensuring that [such] abuses of the legal process by collection agencies are not perpetuated." (Ibid.)

The Yus asserted causes of action for violations of due process and of California debt collection statutes, for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and for abuse of process and unlawful business practice. Judgment was entered for Banks after their motion for summary judgment was granted. In Yu I, we reversed the judgment on the abuse of process and unlawful business practice claims, concluding that there were triable issues as to those claims under our Supreme Court's decision in the Barquis case.

To quote from our opinion in Yu I, Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 98, "held that a creditor who files consumer debt collection actions in an improper venue, knowing that the venue is improper, for the purpose of impairing the debtors' ability to defend themselves, is guilty of 'a gross "abuse of process"' and an '"unlawful . . . business practice"' within the meaning of what is now Business and Professions Code section 17200. In support of this conclusion, the court observed that the venue rules for relatively small claims stemmed from 'recognition of the serious potential for harassment that arises if a plaintiff, in a small monetary action, commences his action in a distant forum. . . . Defendants in such cases will often be financially unable to expend the money to travel to a distant forum, or to hire an attorney to do so, even simply to move for a change of venue. Without the protection of [the venue statute], a plaintiff, aware of these practical limitations, could exploit the situation by filing all such actions in distant counties where a defendant could not afford either to defend or to move for change of venue, and could thereby unfairly obtain default judgments or favorable settlements in such actions.' (7 Cal.3d at p. 118.) [P] The practice of 'distant forum abuse' [citation] alleged in [the Yus'] case is even worse than the one condemned in Barquis, because the practice there involved suits in the wrong venue within California, whereas the practice here involves suits in the wrong jurisdiction -- the even more distant forum of another state." (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1389.)

We held that the Yus' claims and supporting evidence "raised triable issues of fact concerning knowledge and intent [under Barquis's standards] which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment." (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1390.) We concluded that the Virginia courts did not have personal jurisdiction over the Yus, and reasoned, in view of a 1990 Georgia decision against Signet on the same issue and facts, that Banks could be found to have been aware of this problem with their "long-arm program" before they used the program against the Yus. (Yu I, supra, at pp. 1384-1388, 1390, citing Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tillis (1990) 196 Ga.App. 433, 396 S.E.2d 54.) Further evidence of culpable knowledge and intent included Banks' exemption of "people in the limelight, celebrities, attorneys" from the long-arm program. (Yu I at pp. 1382, 1390.) A Capital One officer had testified that suing out-of-state attorneys was viewed as a "bad business decision," and that celebrities were exempted because "'we didn't want to expose the company to any press because we hadn't done everything we needed to do.'" (Id. at p. 1382.) This evidence, which has been likened to "wearing a sign that says, 'Sue me' " (Jaworski, Subprime Lending Under Siege In The Courts -- A Summary Of Illustrative Cases (2001) 55 Consumer Fin. L.Q.Rep. 70, 72 [commenting on Yu I]), along with evidence that Banks "obtained assembly-line default judgments as a regular business practice" through their long-arm program (Chen, supra, 20 Akron L. Rev. at p. 15 [describing the "ideal scenario" for a creditor practicing distant forum abuse]; Yu I, supra, at pp. 1382, 1390 [ninety percent of Banks' long-arm suits resulted in default judgments]), precluded entry of summary judgment for Banks consistent with the decision in Barquis.

We rejected Banks' contention that Barquis was distinguishable because the Yus' default was obtained in compliance with Virginia law. (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1390-1391 [noting that no Virginia appellate court had ever purported to authorize "long-arm" jurisdiction over out-of-state consumers for debt collection purposes].) We also rejected Banks' various arguments as to why Barquis could not be applied to their conduct. The summary judgment was based largely on the theory that Virginia courts had personal jurisdiction over the Yus, and we explained why that theory was incorrect. We pointed out the Yus' lack of minimum contacts with Virginia, and rejected Banks' claim that we could not properly inquire into the Virginia court's jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 1384-1388.) We also rejected Banks' related arguments that, notwithstanding Barquis: (1) no abuse of process could be found because California cannot regulate out-of-state conduct that was lawful where it occurred; (2) principles of sovereignty and comity precluded imposition of liability based on a sister state judgment; and (3) inquiry into the validity of the Virginia judgment could not be used to award any relief apart from refusal to enforce the judgment. (Id. at pp. 1391-1393.) We ultimately concluded "that Barquis's holding can be applied to [Banks'] conduct, even though the distant [forum] abuse occurred in another state and involved the procuring of a foreign judgment." (Id. at p. 1394.)


[b]B. Subsequent Proceedings

When the case returned to the trial court after Banks' petitions to the California Supreme Court for review and to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari were denied, Banks moved for judgment on the pleadings. Banks argued that Barquis was wrongly decided insofar as it would subject them to liability for abuse of process, and that their conduct was privileged, under the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(2)) and the First Amendment. Capital One argued separately that the Yus had no claim against it for abuse of process because it was not involved in obtaining the Virginia default judgment and garnishment summons against the Yus. The Yus opposed the motion on the ground, among others, that Banks' arguments were barred by our decision in Yu I under the doctrine of the law of the case. The court granted the motion, with leave to amend to allege facts showing that: (1) the Yus "had no contacts with Virginia beyond acceptance of the credit card solicitation"; and (2) Banks executed on the default judgment "without a good faith belief that there existed any additional bases for personal jurisdiction beyond the acceptance of the credit card solicitation."

The Yus filed a third amended complaint that added allegations pertaining to Virginia jurisdiction as required by the court's order. They also added an allegation acknowledging that Ms. Yu had accepted a secured credit card from Signet in addition to the unsecured credit card that became the subject of the collection action. They deleted allegations relating to the causes of action on which summary judgment for Banks had been granted. They left unchanged the allegations of abuse of process and unfair business practice.

Banks then filed a demurrer to the third amended complaint, reasserting the same arguments they had advanced in their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Capital One demurred separately to the cause of action for abuse of process, making the same argument it had raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Banks also filed a special motion to strike the third amended complaint under the anti-SLAPP law. The court sustained Banks' demurrer without leave to amend, and denied the anti-SLAPP motion as well as the Capital One demurrer as moot.

The court determined that the Yus could not state a cause of action for abuse of process or, alternatively, that Banks' conduct was immunized by the litigation privilege, and explained its reasoning in a statement of decision. Since it was "obvious" that "it is not wrongful to litigate an action absent personal jurisdiction," the court concluded that there was no abuse of process, and "absent sufficient allegations of misuse of process, actions in pursuing and executing upon the underlying judgment appeared to be exactly the type of acts protected by the litigation privilege." The court found that dismissal of the abuse of process claim disposed of the unfair business practice claim. The court acknowledged that Yu I set forth the "law of the case" and that Yu I had cited the Barquis decision "for the general proposition that bringing suit in a distant forum could constitute tortious conduct." However, the court thought that Barquis was distinguishable and that Barquis was in any event "limited to its facts."


<center>[b]II. YUS' APPEAL (A095102)</center> A. Law of the Case

The Yus contend that they have stated viable abuse of process and unlawful business practice causes of action under the Barquis decision, and that the trial court's conclusions to the contrary violated the law of the case established in Yu I.

Under the law of the case doctrine, "'the decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.'" (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 301, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948.) The doctrine applies to decisions of intermediate appellate courts as well as courts of last resort. (People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211.) The doctrine promotes finality by preventing relitigation of issues previously decided. (George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291; Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 434, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466, 696 P.2d 1308; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786, 897 P.2d 481). The doctrine does not apply to points of law that might have been determined, but were not decided in the prior appeal. (Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 302.) However, the doctrine does extend to questions that were implicitly determined because they were essential to the prior decision. (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 73, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 913, pp. 948-950 and authorities cited.) The doctrine is one of procedure rather than jurisdiction, and can be disregarded in exceptional circumstances. (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 435.) "The principal ground for making an exception to the doctrine of law of the case is an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law." (Clemente v. State of California (1985) 40 Cal.3d 202, 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 445, 707 P.2d 818.) The doctrine can also be disregarded to avoid an unjust decision. (People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 846.) For the "unjust decision" exception to apply, "there must at least be demonstrated a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice." (Ibid.)

In Yu I, we held that Barquis was not distinguishable from the Yus' case and that, under Barquis's standards, there were triable issues as to Banks' knowledge and intent that precluded summary judgment against the Yus on their abuse of process claim. (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1389, 1390.) We thereby necessarily determined that the Yus had stated a cause of action for abuse of process, and that Barquis remained good law. Under the principles set forth in the preceding paragraph, those explicit and implicit conclusions of law established the law of the case, and could be reexamined only as required to account for changes in the law after Yu I, or to avoid an injustice. Since neither of those exceptions to the law of the case doctrine is applicable, the trial court's decision is untenable.

The trial court cited Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 795, 224 Cal. Rptr. 57, to justify its departure from Yu I. The Donohue decision did not involve the law of the case doctrine; it simply noted that denial of a summary judgment motion did not necessarily preclude a later judgment on the pleadings. (Id. at pp. 801-802.) Failure to state a cause of action is an issue that can generally be raised at any time (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, §§ 911, 954, pp. 370-371, 410-411), but that ability may be circumscribed by the law of the case. Once an appellate court has determined a point of law in the action, arguments inconsistent with that determination cannot be entertained unless an exception to the law of the case doctrine is applicable.

Banks' arguments in support of their demurrer are inconsistent with our opinion in Yu I because they rest on the proposition that Barquis was wrongly decided. Banks maintain that Barquis was mistaken insofar as it indicated that the filing of a complaint could be an abuse of process. Alternatively, Banks contend that their collection action was absolutely privileged under the litigation privilege or the First Amendment; if either of these privileges applies, then no form of distant forum abuse would be actionable, not even the intrastate variety addressed in Barquis. Since Yu I necessarily concluded that Barquis remains good law, these new arguments were contrary to the law of the case. [FN 1]

<dl> <dd> [FN 1] There is authority that only the United States Supreme Court can establish the law of the case on federal constitutional and statutory issues. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 896, p. 931.) This proposition is based entirely on the following passage in Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1930) 209 Cal. 460, 472, 288 P. 775: "The doctrine of the 'law of the case' applies only to the decisions of the highest court on the particular issue under consideration. Where this issue involves the construction of the Constitution or statutes of the United States, the highest court is the Supreme Court of the United States, and, hence, the doctrine of the 'law of the case' does not apply to a decision of the state Supreme Court." This portion of the Atchison opinion has not been followed in any subsequent case, and has been effectively overruled in subsequent decisions. The idea that only the "highest court" can create law of the case cannot be squared with the precedents indicating that the doctrine applies to decisions of intermediate appellate courts (e.g., Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 434; People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 841), and it is apparent under People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th 764, that our decisions can establish law of the case as to federal questions, even those of constitutional dimension (id. at pp. 786-790 [Court of Appeal's determination of Fourth Amendment issues was law of the case]). In Atchison, our Supreme Court departed from an earlier decision in the case because the United States Supreme Court had announced a new rule in the interim; Atchison thus falls within the exception to the law of the case doctrine for subsequent changes in the law. </dd> </dl> Banks' new arguments are not based on developments in the law after Yu I. The abuse of process and litigation privilege arguments are grounded on Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 728 P.2d 1202, Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 270 Cal. Rptr. 1, 791 P.2d 587, and Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 847 P.2d 1044, a series of precedents which according to Banks has so "eroded" Barquis that Barquis must now be "disregarded." Banks' First Amendment claim is likewise predicated on various pre-Yu I precedents. Accordingly, the new arguments do not fall within the subsequent-developments exception to the law of the case doctrine. The "unjust decision" exception to the doctrine is also inapplicable. To address Banks' new arguments at length would defeat the doctrine's principal purpose (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 435 [promotion of judicial economy]), but we would observe that none of the new cases Banks now cite are directly on point. The new cases do not involve distant forum abuse, and do not establish that it was a "manifest misapplication of existing principles" to recognize a cause of action for that abuse in Yu I. (People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 846.) Banks contend that the filing of a lawsuit cannot be an abuse of process, but Barquis is a recognized exception to that general rule. (Com. to BAJI No. 7.71 (9th ed. 2002) p. 269.) The Barquis court explained why distant forum abuse "amounts to a tortious abuse of process" (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n., supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 103-104), noting the "broad reach" of this tort, which had "evolved as a 'catch-all' category to cover improper uses of the judicial machinery" that do not constitute malicious prosecution (id. at p. 104, fn. 4). Nor are we persuaded by any of Banks' authorities, which do not remotely consider the question, that creditors have a First Amendment right or other privilege to commit distant forum abuse.

Banks observe that the law of the case doctrine does not extend to issues that might have been, but were not, raised in a prior appeal -- an oblique acknowledgement that the new arguments could have been asserted in Yu I. However, the issue -- whether the Yus have a cause of action for abuse of process under Barquis -- is the same as before; Banks have simply refined their arguments as to that issue. In Yu I we were told that Barquis could not be applied because the distant forum abuse in this case involved a foreign judgment and conduct in another state; now we are told that Barquis cannot be applied because, for various reasons, it is a dead letter even in California.

Banks maintain that they are free to advance the new arguments because we did not previously address them in Yu I, but if that were true, then Banks could raise their arguments in piecemeal fashion and endlessly relitigate Barquis's applicability. After asserting in a first appeal that Barquis's application would violate principles of sister-state sovereignty, Banks could assert in a second appeal that Barquis's application would be precluded by the litigation privilege, and assert in a third appeal that Barquis's application would be inconsistent with the First Amendment, and so on. "Fortunately, fundamental rules of appellate review are specifically designed to preclude the possibility of this type of multiple litigation of the same issue." (People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 841 [discussing the law of the case doctrine].) Litigants are not free to continually reinvent their position on legal issues that have been resolved against them by an appellate court. "It would be absurd that a party who has chosen not to argue a point on a first appeal should stand better as regards the law of the case than one who had argued and lost." (Fogel v. Chestnutt (2d Cir. 1981) 668 F.2d 100, 109.)

Banks suggest that they may raise their new arguments because our unqualified partial reversal in Yu I -- as opposed to a partial reversal with directions--left the case "at large" for further proceedings, including any challenge to the legal sufficiency of the Yus' remaining claims. However, the law of the case doctrine applies following a general remand. (Note, Law of the Case (1953) 5 Stan. L.Rev. 751, 755.)

Therefore, we reiterate what we decided in Yu I: the Yus have a cause of action under Barquis for abuse of process based on Banks' practice of distant forum abuse. Since the dismissal of the unfair business practice claim as well as the abuse of process claim was based on the trial court's conclusion to the contrary, the judgment as to both causes of action must be reversed.


B. Capital One's Demurrer

Capital One contends that the judgment in its favor can be sustained on the alternative theory advanced in its separate demurrer: that although it participated in the long-arm program as Signet's successor, it was not involved in any abuse of process against the Yus. Since this argument does not depend on Barquis's invalidity, and it was not explicitly or implicitly addressed in Yu I, it is not barred by the law of the case. The argument is nevertheless unsupported by the record. According to the third amended complaint, Mr. Yu's wages were garnished from November 1994 to May 1995, and Capital One took over the long-arm program from Signet in November 1994. The complaint thus effectively alleges that Capital One took and received all, or substantially all, of the recovery generated by the collection action. Consequently, Capital One was not entitled to judgment on the ground that it did not participate in the abuse of process against the Yus.


<center>III. BANKS' APPEAL (A094519)</center> A. Preliminary Issues

Banks contend that the trial court erred in denying, as moot, their motion to strike the third amended complaint under the anti-SLAPP law when it sustained their demurrer to that complaint without leave to amend. Banks argue that the sustaining of the demurrer did not obviate the motion to strike because they would have been entitled to attorney's fees and costs if the motion succeeded. (§ 425.16, subd. (c); see Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 218-219; Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 748.) Entirely apart from that argument, the motion to strike is not moot in view of our reversal of the ruling on the demurrer. Thus, the rationale for denial of the motion is no longer viable.

Banks request that we rule on the motion, rather than returning it to the trial court to determine in the first instance. The Yus do not object to this request, and the parties' positions on the motion have been fully briefed herein. Having been asked to rule by the party who would tend to benefit from further delay, we will address the anti-SLAPP issues to expedite the ultimate resolution of the case.

The Yus' threshold argument against the anti-SLAPP motion is that it should be denied as untimely. The statute provides that the motion "may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper" (§ 425.16, subd. (f)), and states that the word "'complaint' includes 'cross-complaint' and 'petition'" (§ 425.16, subd. (h)). Banks' motion was filed years after the case commenced, but within 60 days of service of the third amended complaint. The Yus contend that the term "complaint" in the statute does not include an amended complaint, and thus that the motion could not be filed, without leave of the court, more than 60 days after service of the original complaint.

In support of this construction, the Yus cite history of the 1997 legislation that amended section 425.16 by, among other things, adding subdivision (h) indicating that "complaint" includes "cross-complaint" and "petition." (Stats. 1997, ch. 271, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, p. 1289.) The bill as originally introduced had provided for the addition of the following italicized language to subdivision (f) stating that an anti-SLAPP motion "may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or any amended or supplemental complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper." (Sen. Bill. No. 12.96 (1997 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 28, 1997.) The italicized language was not included in the bill as enacted. (Stats. 1997, ch. 271, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, p. 1289.) The Yus submit that deletion of this language demonstrates that the term "complaint" should not be construed to include "amended complaint." (See, e.g., Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal. App. 2d 591, 607, 45 Cal. Rptr. 512.) They further contend, pointing to the late stage in the case at which Banks' motion was filed, that allowance of an anti-SLAPP motion as a matter of right following service of an amended complaint would be inconsistent with "the statutory design 'to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early.'" (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 65.)

The Yus' position is contrary to the reported cases that have considered the issue. Globetrotter Software v. Elan Computer Group (N.D.Cal. 1999) 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129, concluded, in view of the statutory admonition that the anti-SLAPP law be broadly construed (§ 425.16, subd. (a)), that the 60-day period for filing the motion runs from service of the most recent amended complaint, rather than the original complaint. Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 840-842, reached the same conclusion, pointing out among other things that if the statute were construed as the Yus urge, a plaintiff might attempt to circumvent the anti-SLAPP law by waiting until an amended complaint to assert its SLAPP allegations. (See also DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 565.)

In addition to the persuasive considerations cited in these cases, we note that the record herein points up another problem with the Yus' interpretation. It appears that the original complaint in this case was never served; a first amended complaint was filed shortly after the original one, and it was evidently the first to be served. In this situation, it is unclear under the Yus' construction when Banks would have been entitled as a matter of right to file their motion.

As for the legislative history cited by the Yus, since there are other statutes in the Code of Civil Procedure where the term "complaint" implicitly encompasses "amended complaint" (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 422.10, 430.10, 431.30, 435, 438), the Legislature may have decided that it would have been superfluous to refer to amended complaints in section 425.16, subdivisions (f) or (h). That reference might also have been regarded as unnecessary in view of the bill's other provision directing that the anti-SLAPP statute be broadly construed. (Stats. 1997, ch. 271, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, p. 1288.) Thus, we are unable to read as much into the bill's amendment as the Yus advocate, and will adhere to the precedents on the timeliness issue.

Admittedly, this is not a case where an anti-SLAPP motion was promptly made to counter SLAPP allegations first added to an amended pleading. Banks could have filed their motion at the outset of the case and, like the arguments in their demurrer to the third amended complaint, their anti-SLAPP theory seems to have been an afterthought. Banks' opportunity to belatedly raise that theory arose as a matter of right only because the Yus were required to file a third amended complaint, which deleted many more allegations than it added, and added nothing that implicated the anti-SLAPP law. We nevertheless conclude, for the reasons set forth above, that Banks' motion was timely because it was filed within 60 days of service of the third amended complaint.

<center> <hr noshade="noshade"> <center>California Anti-SLAPP Project

</center> <hr noshade="noshade"> <center>Yu et al. v. Signet Bank/Virginia et al. (concluded)

</center>
B. Merits of the Motion

(1) The Two-Pronged Test

Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides that "[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Section 425.16, subdivision (e) sets forth four categories of "acts in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech," including: "(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . ."

Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion is "a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant's burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken 'in furtherance of the [defendant]'s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,' as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers 'the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.'" (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)


(2) Arising From Protected Activity

The Yus contend that their case does not arise from protected activity because Banks cannot show that the action was brought with the intent to chill their exercise of constitutional speech or petition rights. However, our Supreme Court has recently ruled in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 57, 59, that there is no such "intent-to-chill proof requirement." To satisfy the "arising from" test, it need only be "demonstrated that the defendant's conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in [section 425.16,] subdivision (e)." (Id. at p. 66.) "'From that fact the court may [effectively] presume the purpose of the action was to chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights.'" (Id. at p. 61.)

"The statutory phrase 'cause of action . . . arising from' means simply that the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. [Citations.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. [Citations.] 'A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).'" (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.)

It is ironic that a lawsuit challenging distant forum abuse -- a practice calculated to prevent the Yus' "public participation" in the collection action against them -- should itself meet the threshold definition of a SLAPP suit, but that is the result under the anti-SLAPP statute. Since the Yus' case is based entirely on the collection action Banks filed against them, we conclude that it satisfies the "arising from" standard. "It is well established that filing a lawsuit is an exercise of a party's constitutional right of petition." (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1087.) "A claim for relief filed in . . . court indisputably is a 'statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding' [under] (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1))." (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90.)

This conclusion does not imply that the distant forum abuse alleged by the Yus was a valid exercise of Banks' constitutional rights. The lawfulness of the defendant's petitioning activity is generally not at issue in the "arising from" prong of the anti-SLAPP inquiry; [FN 2] that question is ordinarily addressed in the second, "minimal merit" prong of the inquiry relative to the plaintiff's probability of success on the merits. "'The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.'" (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 94-95.) "That the Legislature expressed a concern in the statute's preamble with lawsuits that chill valid exercise of First Amendment rights does not mean that a court may read a separate proof-of-validity requirement into the operative sections of the statute. [Citations.] Rather, any 'claimed illegitimacy of the defendant's acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the context of the discharge of the plaintiff's [secondary] burden to provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff's case.'" (Id. at p. 94.)

<dl> <dd> [FN 2] It is not argued that the illegality of Banks' petitioning activity has been effectively conceded, or conclusively established by the evidence. (See Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 449, 459; Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1367, disapproved on another point in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 5.) </dd> </dl>
(3) Probability Of Success

(a) Standards To Be Applied

"In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1), a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must '"state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim."' [Citations.] Put another way, the plaintiff 'must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.' [Citations.] In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submission of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim." (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Thus, a plaintiff's burden as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. (Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907-908.) The causes of action need only be shown to have "minimal merit." (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)


(b) Conclusion

In Yu I, we held that Banks were not entitled to summary judgment on the Yus' abuse of process and unfair business practice claims. Here, we likewise conclude that these claims have sufficient potential merit to withstand Banks' anti-SLAPP motion.


(c) Points Previously Determined

Banks' principal arguments in their anti-SLAPP motion are the same as those in their demurrer: that the Yus have no cause of action for abuse of process under post-Barquis precedents, or that, notwithstanding Barquis, distant forum abuse is protected by the First Amendment or the litigation privilege. Our previous discussion of the law of the case has disposed of these arguments. Our prior discussion has also disposed of Capital One's contention, advanced in the anti-SLAPP motion as well as Capital One's separate demurrer, that it cannot be held liable because it was not involved in any abuse of process against the Yus.


(d) Jurisdiction

Banks argue that the Yus have no viable claims because they cannot demonstrate that Virginia lacked personal jurisdiction over them. In Yu I, we concluded that the Yus' case hinged on the fact that they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the Virginia court where their default judgment was taken. (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1384-1385.) We explained why such jurisdiction was lacking on the record presented in Yu I, where it appeared that the Yus had no contact with Virginia other than one Signet credit card. (Id. at pp. 1386-1388.) It has since been confirmed that the Yus had a second Signet credit card, a secured card that required them to maintain a bank account in Virginia. Banks contend that this second credit card and related bank account distinguish the situation considered in Yu I, and provide the minimum contacts required to subject the Yus to personal jurisdiction in Virginia.

Assuming that Yu I is no longer the law of the case on the jurisdictional issue in view of these new facts (Nollan v. California Coastal Com. (1986) 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 724-725, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, rev'd. on other grounds in Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 [doctrine is inapplicable if record is changed in any substantial respect]), the new facts nevertheless do not alter our prior conclusion that Virginia had no personal jurisdiction over the Yus. Although the Yus had two Signet credit cards instead of one, as well as a bank account in Virginia as required for the secured card, they still cannot be deemed to have "'"purposefully directed" [their] activities at residents of the forum'" . . . "'"such that they should reasonably [have] anticipated being haled into court there."'" (Yu I, supra, at p. 1387, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472, 474, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174.)

To conclude that the consumer transactions between the Yus and Signet made the Yus amenable to personal jurisdiction in Virginia would be inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in the Burger King case. As noted in Yu I, Burger King "'emphasized that jurisdiction may not be grounded on a contract . . . whose application would render litigation "so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [a party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.". . . Jurisdictional rules may not be employed against small consumers so as to "cripple their defense.". . . Just as the Due Process Clause allows flexibility in ensuring that commercial actors are not effectively "judgment proof" for the consequences of obligations they voluntarily assume in other States, . . . so too does it prevent rules that would unfairly enable them to obtain default judgments against unwitting customers. . . . [The] court must not be "'blind'" to what "'all others can see and understand.'". . . .'" (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 486.)

Accordingly, we reiterate our holding in Yu I, taking into account the new facts, as follows: "[The Yus] are plainly in the class of 'unwitting customers' the Burger King court sought to protect. They had no relationship with Virginia other than [through] their credit cards, and it was fundamentally unfair to expect them to travel thousands of miles to litigate matters concerning their account." (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388.) We may presume that Banks had recourse against the Yus' Virginia bank account, but that does not mean the Yus were subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. (See 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 237, pp. 798-799 [describing quasi in rem actions].) The jurisdictional issue, even given the new facts, is not a close one.

Banks submit that a contrary conclusion is required under the Virginia Supreme Court's recent decision in Glumina Bank D.D. v. D.C. Diamond Corp. (Va. 2000) 259 Va. 312, 527 S.E.2d 775, where a foreign bank was held subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia under a provision of the state's long-arm statute for "'causes of action for action arising from the person's . . . contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth'" (id. at p. 777). This authority is inapposite because the Yus did not contract to supply any goods or services in Virginia, and the jurisdictional issue is a matter of federal due process, not Virginia law, in any event.


(e) Damages

Banks contend that the Yus cannot prove that they suffered any damages as a result of Banks' conduct. This argument does not apply to the unfair business practice claim (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 170, 973 P.2d 527 [damages are not recoverable on that cause of action]), and does not defeat the cause of action for abuse of process.

Banks maintain, based on the following deposition testimony of Mrs. Yu, that the Yus have admitted that they owed all amounts collected from them in the Virginia action: "Q. And to this day, as you sit here in your deposition, do you have any feeling that you paid money to Signet that you and your husband didn't owe on a legitimate credit card debt? [P] [Yus' counsel]: Objection, calls for a legal conclusion. [P] A. We will pay them, but they took it from us forcefully. They just took any amount they wanted. [P] Q. I understand that you and your husband don't like the way that the money was taken from you. But what I'm asking is whether you think that Signet was not owed the money that you paid them. [P] [Yus' counsel]: Objection, vague and ambiguous. [P] A. Yes, we will pay them because we owe them the money. [P] Q. And what I'm asking you is that -- you have paid them money through the garnishing of your husband's wages; correct? [P] A. Correct. [P] Q. And what I'm asking is whether that money that you paid was owed to Signet. [P] [Yus' counsel]: Objection, calls for a legal conclusion. [P] A. Correct. [P] Q. It was owed to Signet. [P] [Yus' counsel]: Same objection. [P] A. Yes."

For a number of reasons, this testimony cannot be taken as a conclusive admission that the Yus suffered no compensatory damages. First, there is no suggestion that Mrs. Yu was given any breakdown of the amount Banks collected; she was simply being asked whether she disputed the debt. According to other evidence in the record, $3,944.95 was garnished from Mr. Yu's wages. This figure is itemized as follows in the "garnishment summons" that was served on Mr. Yu's employer: $2,191.38 judgment principal; $1,672.57 interest; $48 judgment costs; and $33 garnishment costs. Even if the principal and interest specified in the summons were indisputably owed, additional "judgment" and "garnishment" costs associated with the abusive process, and disputed under the Yus' theory of the case, were also collected. It thus appears that the Yus suffered at least some small amount of economic damages.

Second, in addition to their economic damages, the Yus can seek damages for emotional distress. "Emotional distress is also an accepted item of damage that may be recovered in actions for abuse of process." (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 649, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814.) Banks contend that we decided in Yu I that the Yus cannot recover emotional distress damages because we affirmed the judgment for Banks on the Yus' causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Yu I, we held that Banks' conduct was not sufficiently "outrageous" to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1397-1398), and that the Yus had no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because they had suffered no physical injuries (id. at p. 1397).

These holdings are not, as Banks would have it, law of the case prohibiting the Yus from recovery of emotional distress damages for abuse of process. As explained above, a point does not become the law of the case unless it was actually or implicitly decided in a prior appeal. (People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 842; Estate of Horman, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 73.) Since damages for abuse of process were not at issue in Yu I, nothing in that opinion can be taken to suggest, contrary to established law, that those damages may not include recovery for emotional distress. (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 649.) The lack of physical injury and the absence of outrageous conduct noted in Yu I do not bear on the abuse of process claim because neither factor is an element of that cause of action. (See BAJI No. 7.70 (9th ed. 2002).) That Banks' acts were not so extremely uncivilized as to support a claim that they were undertaken for the specific purpose of distressing the Yus (see Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398) does not mean the Yus cannot recover for distress they suffered as a byproduct of the abuse of process.

Third, the Yus' actual damages will entitle them to punitive damages if their allegations of malice or oppression are credited. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 147, 279 Cal. Rptr. 318, 806 P.2d 1353 [actual damages are a prerequisite for award of punitive damages]; e.g., Coy v. Advance Automatic Sales Co. (1964) 228 Cal. App. 2d 313, 315, 39 Cal. Rptr. 476, disapproved on another point in White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 336, 350, fn. 8, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 438 P.2d 345.) "The award of . . . exemplary damages for abuse of process is well supported." (Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat (1979) 92 Cal. App. 3d 503, 528, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874; e.g., Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 461, 471-472, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344, 446 P.2d 152; see also Yu I, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.)

Thus, Banks have not established that the Yus cannot recover any damages.


(f) Unclean Hands

Banks maintain that any recovery by the Yus is precluded by the equitable defense of unclean hands. "The [unclean hands] doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim." (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978.) The defense can be asserted against an abuse of process claim (see id. at pp. 978, 986 [defense applies in legal as well as equitable actions; defense applied to cause of action for malicious prosecution]), and we will assume without deciding that the defense can be advanced in a motion to strike an unlawful business practice claim (but see Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 179, 999 P.2d 706 ["equitable defenses may not be asserted to wholly defeat a UCL [§ 17200] claim"]). However, Banks have identified no facts sufficient to raise the defense in this case.

The Yus' alleged misconduct is what Banks call their "cavalier attitude" toward repaying their debt to Signet. In Banks' view, this attitude was reflected in Mr. Yu's deposition, where he testified that all he could remember about a letter he received from Signet was that it was "just [a] regular collection letter stating how much you owe them, which account number, blah blah, and who to call, the 800 number on the bottom." He also said that when he received a packet of documents from Signet about garnishing his wages, he thought Signet might be "bluffing," and took a "wait-and-see attitude" as to "whether it's really going to happen or not." He added, "I don't know if they are legal documents are not. I have no idea. It comes all the way from Virginia and I've never seen a Court of Virginia paper before. That's the reason why I thought these are phony stamps on it they send to--maybe I thought it was a collection tactic that they use to maybe scare people off." In addition to this testimony, there is evidence that the Yus received no communication from Signet for four years after their account was declared delinquent, and thought their debt had been paid.

If the culpability of the Yus' behavior and attitude toward their obligation were relevant, there would be enough room for dispute to preclude the granting of a motion to strike on that issue. (See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 392, 407-408 [unclean hands defense generally raises questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment].) In our view, however, the circumstances under which a debt is incurred are irrelevant to a claim based on collection of the debt through distant forum abuse. "The misconduct that brings the unclean hands doctrine into play must relate directly to the cause at issue. Past improper conduct or prior misconduct that only indirectly affects the problem before the court does not suffice." (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.) The problems associated with distant forum abuse -- impairing individuals' rights to defend collection suits, and undermining of confidence in the judiciary (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 104, 108) -- have nothing to do with why a debt is owed.

Moreover, the unclean hands doctrine is one that "protects the court's, rather than the opposing party's, interests." (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 978.) The courts' strong interest in deterring distant forum abuse (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 108) requires that the unclean hands defense be narrowly applied in a suit to redress that abuse. (See 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) Equity, § 13 ["clean hands defense will not be recognized when to do so would be harmful to the public interest"]; compare Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 986 [public policy favors broad application of defense in malicious prosecution actions].) We therefore reject Banks' attempt to shift the focus of the case away from it actions and intent onto "the general morals of the parties." (Id. at p. 979.)


<center>IV. DISPOSITIONS</center> The judgment for Banks is reversed (A095102), and the order denying Banks' motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute is affirmed (AO94519). The Yus' request for attorney's fees and costs in connection with the motion to strike (§ 425.16, subd. (c) [motion frivolous or designed solely for delay]) is denied, but they shall recover their costs on both appeals (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 26(a)(1), (c)).

Kay, P.J.

We concur:

Reardon, J.
Sepulveda, J.

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